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THE DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

After a month of feverish maneuvering, which began on 25 February with the ouster of General Nagib, the political situation in Egypt appears to be unchanged in at least two major aspects. Colonel Nasr and the Revolutionary Command Council are again back in top position, with renewed determination to carry out their "Revolution" without compromising with political factions. General Nagib is also back as a figurehead for the regime. His prestige is less; his position somewhat weakened. He is apparently ill. Nagib retains, however, considerable popular following.

Three new factors have been introduced into the situation as a result of the month-long struggle for power between Nasr and Nagib.

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First, ~~Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000300010008-5~~ the ouster of the military by the RCC and the return to civil government, and some of their leaders who had been under arrest were released. Most of the leaders of the ultranationalistic Wafd and the religious nationalistic Moslem Brotherhood are now at liberty. Secondly, there has been a general increase of activity among both civilian and military extremists and opportunists as a result of the over-all loss of prestige by the RCC and by Nagib. And finally, more popular frustration has been generated by the postponement of a return to civil government.

The Nagib-Nasr contest represents the clash between the authoritarian Revolutionary Council and the popular forces demanding a return to parliamentary government. Until it is resolved there can be no political stability in Egypt and no hope for constructive developments.

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At present no real or firm reconciliation between the two men seems possible. At the moment Nagib appears on the decline physically and prestige-wise. Opposition elements, however, may continue to use him as a rallying point.

The rise of Nasr poses all the problems inherent in a military dictatorship. Nasr and the Revolutionary Council are unpopular and lack widespread support. Even in the armed forces certain groups, particularly among the cavalry and artillery, are believed opposed to continuation of the Revolutionary Council's rule.

If Nasr succeeds in establishing himself firmly and absolutely

25X1C in power, [REDACTED] he will make a concerted effort to reach an agreement with Britain on the Suez base. with full

concern for power and prestige. [REDACTED] to

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control terrorist activities in the Suez Canal zone and thus restore
order and permit Britain to approach the conference table. [REDACTED]

25X6 [REDACTED] 25X6
Settlement of the Suez question would provide the Revolutionary
Council with an important political victory which it sorely needs.
Only then can the regime attempt to tackle the deep economic problems
which confront it.

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